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INTRODUCTION 
The Idaho State Tax Commission's (Commission) reply \\iIl address each of the 
arguments PaciliCorp propounds in its response brief. Before addressing these arguments. 
ho\ve\er. the Commission reiterates the relief it seeks. 
As PacitiCorp notes, the trial court heard the testimony of the Commission's appraiser. 
Mr. Rudd. the Commission's expert appraiser. Mr. Eyre. and PacitiCorp's expert appraiser. 
Mr. Tegarden. It found Mr. Tegarden's testimony the more compelling. This is not relevant to 
the Commission's appeal. The Commission is not asking the Court to substitute the appraisal of 
either Mr. Rudel or Mr. Eyre t()r that of Mr. Tegarden. Rather. the Commission asks that 
PaciliCmp's appraisal should be rejected because its cost approach is deeply l1awed. If 
PacitiCorp's appraisal is rejected, then the Commission respectfully requests the Court uphold 
the Commission's decision on the ground PaciliCorp did not bear its burden of proving incorrect 
the value establ ished in that decision. 
ARGUMENT 
PaciliCorp asserts the Commission's claim that obsolescence does ·not exist must be 
rejccted in light of the Commission's o'vvn finding of obsolescence. (Respondent's BrieL p. I I.) 
Thc Commission docs not claim obsolescence docs not exist. It argues that PacitiCorp's 
appraisal docs not demonstrate that (/(ldilioflUI obsolescence exists; it argues that PaciliCorp's 
appraisal greatly overestimates any reasonable amount of additional ubsulescence. cvcn 
assuming the cxistence oj' additional obsulescence . 
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For tax year 2008, the Commission, sitting as the State Board of Equalization. conducted 
a hearing and issued a decision amending Commission staffs appraisal. It granted an 
obsolescence adjustment of 7.93 percent. It is not clear \\hy this adjustment \\as made.' The 
Commission presumably heard evidence during the hearing that indicated an obsolescence 
adj ustment was appropriate. The decision does not indicate the adj ustment \\as based on income 
shorttldl analysis. Mr. Tegarden \vas not a witness at the Commission hearing. and his appraisal 
was 110t in evidence. PacitiCorp's employee, Mr. Ross, developed the income shorttldl data 
presented at the heari ng. He requested an obsolescence adjustment of 26.6 percent. 
(Commission decision attached to PacitiCorp's Petition for Judicial Review.) Mr. Ross's ligures 
showed a 26.6 percent income shortfall, while Mr. Tegarclen' s income shortlldl calculation 
indicates 20.88 percent. This is a n1(~jor discrepancy for the same approach valuing the same 
company for the same year. It shows how unreliable the income shorttldl approach is \vhen used 
as PacitiCorp uses it. In any event, that the Commission made an adj ustment for less 
than 8 percent obsolescence is not an argument for finding more than 20 percent obsolescence. 
PacitiCorp next argues that its appraisal and testimony provide substantial evidence that 
obsolescence exists. This gets to the crux of the matter. They do not. PacitiCorp identities 
possible causes of obsolescence without demonstrating that these possibilities, in Illet. caused 
obsolescence. The amount or obsolescence associated with each cause is never computed. That 
there is an effect lIn PacitiCorp's hottom line from each asserted calise is Ile\er shmvn. 
PaciliCorp identities go\ernmental regulation as the primary cause oj' ohsolescence. Ih~ 
tirst ljllestion is, ho\v does it kno\v this'? Mr. Tegarden's appraisal purports simultaneously to 
measure both functional and economic obsolescence. (Tegarden. Tcstimony of July 14,2010. p. 
I The \(lting Illeillbers of rile :::!()I)X State Board of Fqllali/iltion are flO lunger with the COl1ll1li"ion. One n.:tirc:d. Olle 
and olle \\as appointed to a difkrel1t position in state g()\erllillent. 
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110. lines -+-9.) But if it measures obsolescence. it also measures non-obsolescence; for example. 
had managcmcnt. In the absence of specific data, hoyv can PacifiCorp state that gOvernment 
regulation causes income shortl~dl'? Any income shortl~dl measured could be the result uf 
somcthing dsc. either legitimate obsolescence or some other t~lctor that is not obsolescence at 
all. 
PaciliCorp's tirst asserted culprit is the regulatory lag time in getting new plant and 
equipment into rate base. 2 Respondent notes that according to Mr. Tegarden another of the 
primary causes of obsolescence is "the regulatory commission's specific excl usion of certain 
properties from rate base. i.e. those properties financed by the funds provided by the deferral or 
federal income taxes.,·J Respondent also notes that Mr. McDougal identitied additional 
regulations that result in obsolescence. All of these things should be directly and independently 
quantilied. but in the income shortl~dl methodology none of them arc. They arc a mere list of 
possibilities. nothing more. 
Take. for instance. regulatory lag in getting plant and equipment into rate base. I low 
could this be demonstrated in a way that shows obsolescence exists and that it actually adversely 
affects PaciliCorp's revenue stream'? At a minimum, PacitiCorp should identify the asset, note 
when it was brought on line. then show \vhen the asset was allowed in rate base. It can then olTer 
a calculation shO\ving how this affects the bottom line. It docs not do this. With respect to 
regulatory lag. a fe\\ nther points are \\orth noting. The nevv asset \\ill olten generate income 
illlmcdiately. e\en though it is not in rate base. ;\ new generation facility might sell clectricity 
"/\ ulilily'S "rate hase' repre\ents the original cost minus depreciation of all property justitiabl:- used by the utility 
ill providing services to ilS clistOl1lers. Utilities are allowed to charge custolllers rales \vhich will yield a certain 
percentage return on the utility's total investment. Thus. the larger the utility's rate base the higher the rates utilities 
can charge to custoll1ers." Cili:::i'11 's Ulili!i"s COlllpLlny v, Idaho Puhlic ['lililii'.I' C{)/Ilmission, \)<) Idaho 164 at 16\), 
579P,2d IIOat 115(1978). 
\ Iktl:rred incoille taxes will be referred to as DrT. PaciliCorp's position on whether plant and equipment tln~lnced 
with [)[T is illcluded in rate base or not is unclear. \Ir. Tegarden's quote is It.HlIld nn page 14 l)fRespondellt's brid~ 
On page 2X. l'~lciliCorp takes cxception In this samc point \vhell the COl11mission makes it. 
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before the t~lCility is induded in rate base. When a new customer is served. that customer \vill 
start paying for dectricity right a\vay - he does not get free electricity until his connection is 
included in rate base. Note, too, that PacifiCorp's appraisal focuses on the adverse impact of 
regulatory lag. It ignores the benefits of regulatory lag. Suppose a utility believes the PUC will 
lower its permitted return at its next rate hearing. So long as it postpones its rate hearing. it 
bene/its from regulatory lag. 
What about alleged loss associated with the failure to include deferred income taxes 
(DIT) linanced plant and equipment in rate base? Again. this should be directly quantitied. A 
utility should at least reveal the dollar value of plant and equipment financed with orr and 
calculate how DIT, by itself. contributes to obsolescence. In t~lct, to quantify the alleged 
detrimental effect of not allowing the value of orr tinanced plant and equipment in rate base. 
PaciJiCorp should quantify the present value of future income loss on plant and equipment 
linanced with orr. PacitiCorp docs not want to do this because the cost of capital for orr 
financed plant and equipment is zero. There is no future income loss, hence no detrimental 
effect. Put bluntly. any rate of return on Orr-financed plant and equipment is gravy. This is 
why the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) docs not allow the value of Orr-financed plant and 
equipmcnt in rate base. The PUC is not penalizing the company; it simply docs not allow a 
\\indf~t11 fur plant and equipment that is financed interest-free. (Sec, Eyre. Testimony of 
Julv 15.2010, p. 292, line 25 through p. 293. lines 1-5.) 
Thc same puint can be l11ade in a different way. The PacifiCurp appraisal de\elops ~t 
"required rak of return" of 9. I percent in its income approach. It then incorporates this 
"required rate of return" into its cost approach. The f~dlacy underlying PaciJiCorp's view of DIT 
begins to be apparent when "requircJ rate or return" is referred to by the more descriptive 
,\PPFLL\NrS RLPLY BRIEI' ,+ 
"l11ark~t \veighkd cost of capital:' Drr do~s not increase weighted cost of capital because it 
bears 110 cost. It is th~ sal11~ as an inkrest fr~~ loan. There is no required rat~ of return necessary 
to o1'fset the cost of the costless DIT. This is the point of Warren Buffett's comment extolling 
the benefits of DIT quoted in the Commission's opening brief When PaciJiCorp claims 
regulatory harm because DIT linanced plant and equipment is not included in rate base, it 
assumes such equipment should be in rate base. The claim for obsolescence is based on this 
tlmved assumption. The assumption is l1a\ved because the PUC should not allow recowry or 
costs when there are no costs. Yet, Mr. Tegarden identified the l~tilure to put Drr tinanced plant 
and equipment in rate base as a chief cause of the obsolescence his methodology purports to 
identify. 
1'vlr. McDougal lists additional government regulation causing under-earning. These arc: 
the usc of historic versus future test periods when setting rates, inte~jurisdictional cost allocation 
issues that result in less than 100 percent of costs being recovered, the absence of power cost 
mechanisms to pass costs on without a rate case being filed, and political Llctors such as those 
ElVoring certain 10rms of generation over others. In the absence of probative evidence showing 
these l~lctorS actually cause obsolescence and in what amount, this is nothing more than a list of 
possibilities. There is a further question. "Under-earning" compared to what? Presumably, 
Mr. McDougal means PaciliCorp is not earning the maximum return authorized by the various 
p[ rcs of tlte statcs in which it sells. nut when did the ceiling become the l1oor? Should nut 
p[ 'Cs be setting maximull1 rclurns that are dirticult to reach? If it is easy to reach the maximum 
return allowed by law, what incentive is there to become a more erticient producer'? That the 
ceiling is ollcnjust out of reach is indicative ofincentivc, not obsolescence. 
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PacifiCorp next argues that its use of the income short[dl method is endorsed by various 
respected texts and court decisions. It cites The Appraisal Institute, Appraisal of Real Estate 
(13 lh cd. 2008) (Appraisal of Real Estate), and Ring and Boykin's Third Edition of the Valuation 
ur Real Estate (1986) (Ring and Boykin). Income shortfall is a valid method when properly 
used, but it is not properly used in this casco A proper use is illustrated in Appraisal of Real 
Estate at page 444. A 4,000 square root retail building is in an over-supplied market. The O\'Cr-
supply, which is unique to the subject market and expected to last indefinitely, was caused by 
overbuilding. Rents, which in a normal market would be $8.00 per square 1'001, are $6.25 per 
sq uare foot. The total income loss is $7,000 [($8.00-$6.25=$1.75) x 4000j. A market derived 
capitalization rate is 10 percent. This yields $70,000 in economic obsolescence. ($7,000 -;- .10 = 
$7(U)()O.) 
This income shortJ~dl methodology is used with a stand-alone structure where it can be 
straightforwardly applied. The cause of the obsolescence is specifically identified over-
building. The amount of income loss associated with the specifically identified cause is directly 
computed - $1.75 per square foot by the number of square feet. The diminution in value is 
caused only by obsolescence. The cause is unique to the subject's market. Contrast this to the 
PaciliCorp appraisal. Not a stand-alone structure, but a multi-state utility is appraised. The 
cause of the obsolescence is asserted to be \'arious l<mns of government regulation. The amount 
of obsolescence associatcd with each regulation is not caleulated. Factors that arc 110t 
ubsoicscel1ce at all \\ill be relkcted in thl' income slwrtJ'all. 
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Ring and Boykin endorse the income shortfall approach for use in utility valuation. Even 
on Ring and Boykin's terms, hO\vever. PacifiCorp's appraisal is \vanting. Ring and Boykin 
identity an income shortl~lll method that PacifiCorp does not use. (Petitioner Exhibit 20, 
Tegarden AppraisaL p. 31.) Using Ring and Boykin's method we see that: 
Market rate of capitalization (using Mr. Tegarden' s estimate) is 9. I 0 percent 
Less allowed rate of return 
Yields a loss in earnings of .83 percent 
Performing Ring and Boykin's obsolescence calculation yields 9.) 2 percent obsolescence. 
(.83 percent 7 9.10 percent 9.12 percent) Why did Mr. Tegarden choose an income shortt~dl 
calculation that yields 20.88 percent obsolescence when the text he relies upon to justify his 
method would calculate 9.12 percent obsolescence using Paci fiCorp's allowed rate of return in 
Idaho'? lIe never says. This Elilure alone makes the appraisal suspect. It is just another example 
of the lack of precision inherent in Mr. Tegarden's methodology. This lack of precision is 
minimized when specific probative evidence of obsolescence is required. This regulation caused 
a cutback in production in this amount at this plant resulting in a loss of this much income. 
The same lack of precision is also on display in PacifiCorp's Rcsponse Brief. PacifiCorp 
argues that Ring and Boykin provide an authoritative definition of external obsolescencc. This is 
thc loss in value "caused by the diftCrence in the rate allowed by regulatory agencies and the ralL' 
of retul'll that the in\'l;stment market indicates is competitive to attract a \villing. able. aIllI 
inforll1ed purchaser." As sho\\ n. this calculation. using Idaho's allowed rate of return as an 
exam pic. yields 9. I 2 percent obsolescence. In the next paragraph. PacitiCorp argues for 
something quite different. It transforms the Ring and Boykin method (9.10 percent - 8.27 
j This is PacitiCorp's actual ratt: ofrdurn in Idaho t,Jr 2008. It is takt:n li'om the Idaho PUC ratt: case I'AC-L~-()7-0:". 
(hkr \lo. 30+X2. p. 4 ("-\'\\_"-\/J21L\:"i.ll~llltJ.R()',!jILtt:rn<;;.1Lgt.s.QS._~11l11rn~trIT..!~Qi0705.il1mD t:fkctivt: January 1.2008. 
PaciliCorp. ofcllurst:. opcratt:s in (){ht:r sUlks as \\cll. This t:xalllpk is illustrativt: . 
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percent) into 9.10 percent - 7.2 percent. This is accomplished by substituting a projected rate of 
return. 7.2 percent. for the allowed rate of return. (Response Briet~ pp. 17 & 18.) This increases 
obsolescence to Mr. Tegarden's 20.88 percent. Choosing one calculation over another to 
maximize obsolescence without even trying to justify the choice is an example of the excessive 
subjectivity in rvlr. Tegarden's methodology. 
PacifiCorp next argues that Mr. Tegarden's approach has becn accepted by the Indiana 
tax court. As to court decisions. precedent is mixed. Mr. Tegarden' s approach to appraising 
PaciliCorp has been examined. found wanting, and rejected in Montana for tax years 2005. 2006. 
and 2007. 12005 tax year: 2007 WL 2220872 (Mont. Tax App. Bd. pp. 13-15): 2006 and 2007 
tax years: 20 II WL 130 I 02 (Mont. Tax Appeal B(\. pp. 25-28.] PacitiCorp appealed the Board's 
2005 value to the Montana Supreme Court but did not challenge the rejeetion of Mr. Tegarden's 
income shortf~dl approach. Pw;(jiCorp v. State oIlviontana, 253 P.3d 847 at 853, 360 Mont. 259 
at 268-69 (Mont. S. Ct. 20 11). The Montana Tax Appeal board decisions are particularly 
relevant. These were multi-day hearings with much expert testimony held before a specialist 
tribunal examining the same company using the same appraiser. They dissect Mr. Tegarden's 
method in detail and find it inadequate for many of the same reasons the Commission now urges. 
In addition to Montana's specific rejection of Mr. Tegarden's income shortfall approach. 
the approach was more generally rejected in Oregon. In De/ta "iiI' Ulles. Illc. v. Deportment oj' 
N(,l'L'IlIIL!. ()X4 P.2d X36. 328 Or. 5% (Or. S. ('1. I (99). the Oregon Supreme Court rejected 
Delta's "incol11e-dclicicncy" metlJod that "calculated obsolescence by comparing the rate or 
return on the assets subject to taxation to the rate of return rcquired to attract investmcnt." (/)('/I({ 
. iiI' Lines, 984 P.2d at 646.) The Court fOLlnd it significant that using the income-dcliciency 
mcthod. thc cost indicator of valuc equals the income indicator. This can strip the cost approach 
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uf its usefulness as an inckpl.'ndent indicator of value. The Court said it \\as unable to conclude 
from the e\idencl.' before it what type of obsolescence adjustment. if any. was warranted. 
PaciliCorp's appraisal also calculates obsolescence by comparing the estimated actual rak of 
rclurn to the rate of return it claims is required by the market. The e\idl.'nce for obsolescence is 
the same hcre as it \Vas in De/la /Jir Lines. that is to say. non-specific. 
De//([ A ir Lines is interesting for another reason. The Court sought guidance fi'om the 
Wl.'skrn States Association of Tax Administrators (WSATA) Handbook. Whilc ultimately not 
helpful in the airline case, the Court did note the handbook's statement concerning deducting for 
obsolescence when using the historical cost less depreciation (lICLD) cost indicator. The 
I landbook states: 
IICLD cost indicators are generally not adjusted further to account for 
appreciation or depreciation. A deduction from HCLD for obsolescence is just as 
inconsistent as adding value to HCLD because some of the utility's property has 
increased in value since it was acquired, or because the utility's earnings arc 
extraordinarily high for some reason (e.g. lax regulatory oversight). The practice 
of not adjusting lICLD for perceived obsolescence cloes not mean that 
obsolescence has not been considered and measured, since as noted previollsly, 
regulatory depreciation should. in theory, reflect all forms of obsolescence. 
WSATA I Iandbook at II-12. 
In this case. of course. the Commission applied regulatory depreciation in arriving at its value. 
/\t trial. PaciliCorp attempted to discredit the WSATA IIandbook. Ring and Boykin. 
hO\\c\er. cite WSATA on page -+ 19 of their text. Ring and Boykin may disagree with the above 
quote. but they bclic\c WS,\TA ,1lIthl)J"itati\c enough to quote. COllcl'rning the WSXIA 
I Iandbook. thc Commission's expert appraiser, Mr. Eyre tcstified. "I think it is the most 
autitoritativc treatise on this subject out therc ..... ' (Lrye. Testimony of July 15.2010, p. 290. 
Ii Ile I.) 
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PacitiCorp next maintains that the depreciation it reports to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) does not account for all depreciation. PacitiCorp argues that 
\\hen the Commission notes that PacitiCorp's self-reported depreciation is already supposed to 
include ohsolescence. the Commission is contradicted by its own witness. It is not. The 
Commission's witness, Dr. Johnson, was asked if book depreciation "on the FERC" includes all 
forms of economic obsolescence. Dr. Johnson responded that the intent of the regulatory process 
is to pick up all forms of ohsolescence and that there is no intent to exclude economic 
obsolescence. but that he could not say it "precisely picks up every form or obsolescence." The 
Commission's point is still valid. The depreciation PacifiCorp reports to FERC is supposed to 
include obsolescence. Dr. Johnson testified he cannot say the FERC report captures absolutely 
el'erything. This is small support for diminishing the value of a company by almost 21 percent 
more than depreciation already claimed. 
PaciliCorp also argues that the depreciation it reports to FERC is not "self.-reported" 
because the depreciation figure is determined by various state PUCs. But PaciJiCorp's input into 
the depreciation figures is crucial. As PacifiCorp notes, Mr. McDougal testified that the 
company submits a proposed depreciation study to various state PUCs every live years. This is 
then reviewed, and the PUCs determine the depreciation rate that will be used. When PaciliCorp 
reports annual depreciation to FERC, the starting point for the ligure is its own submissions to 
state P! JCs. Furthermore, as Mr. l\1cDougal states. there arc diflCrent depreciation rates set hy 
dil'!'erl'llt Pl'Cs. (\IcDougal. testimony of July 16,2010. p. 134, lines I 17.) PacillCorp cannot 
be simply echoing a PUC depreciation rate \vhen there arc different PlJC rates. I·'inally. the 
depreciation PaciliCorp reports to FERC is supposed to be reliahle. That is the point of the 
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report. If PacifiCorp reports ligures it thinks are unreliable. it should at least note the fact. The 
FERC filing has no such caveat. 
PacifiCorp's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tiling contains no such caveat 
either. A revie\v of the SEC tiling discloses depreciation of $6.125 billion as of 
December 31.2007. (petitioner Exhibit 2, SEC Form 10-K. p. 65.) This depreciatiun figure is in 
line with M r. Tegarden' s depreciation number bet()re he subtracts additional 0 bso lescence: 
approximately $6.692 billion. (Petitioner Exhibit 20. Tegarden Appraisal, p. 27.) It is also 
similar to Mr. Rudd's and Mr. Eyre's depreciation figures. PacifiCorp's 10-K docs not mention 
the additional depreciation of $2.325 billion due to obsolescence that PacitiCorp wants /()r 
property tax purposes. 
PacifiCorp next argues that Mr. Tegarden and Mr. McDougal never said PacifiCorp 
would always operate in the red. This argument has merit. The Commission accepts that vvhat 
Mr. Tegarden and Mr. McDougal were really saying is that for every dollar PacifiCorp invests. it 
receives less than a dollar of benefit. The witnesses were speaking of opportunity cost. not 
actual red ink. This, however, c10es not alter the Commission's point. Why would anyone, 
especially Berkshire Hathaway, ever invest in PacitiCorp if there is an eternal opportunity cost in 
making the investment? And. if you did buy it, why vvould you hold on to it? After alL if you 
receive less than a dollar of benefit f()r e\'ery dollar YOLI invest, the company will never again be 
worth as l11uch as it is right now. Yet Paci/iCorp has a ten-year plan! Respondent Exhibit 516. 
(scaled)! ~lI1d even !\1r. Tegarden assumes Berkshire IIathaway intends to hold the company f()r 
the long term. (Petitioner Exhibit 20. Tegarden Appraisal, p. 94 referring to a "patient and long-
term \'ie"v.") The fact that PaciliCorp was purchased in the first place, together with the f~lct that 
thc investment appears to be long-term. both argue against the central theme of Mr. Tegarden's 
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appraisal, that PacifiCnrp willncvcr earn thc revenue it should. Further. the Commission's point 
concerning the len year plan is \alid. It docs not say PacitiCorp will ncver earn the revenue it 
should. But, if true, \vould not such a point figure prominently in a 137 page ten-year plan'?~ 
The Commission argues that the income shortt~lll method does not take into account the 
additional benefit to the company provickd by orr. It noted that the Commission's expert. 
Dr. Johnson estimated that taking this benefit into account \Yould reduce Mr. Tegarden's cost of 
capital of 9.) () percent to about 7 percent. PacifiCorp responds that this contradicts the 
Commission's own cost of capital calculations. It docs not. Neither the Commission's appraiser 
nor its expert vvitness subtracted additional obsolescencc bascd on the argument that PUCs do 
not allow DIT financed plant and equipment into rate base. Dr. Johnson's point is that if you 
attempt to make this additional deduction for the alleged 'DIT harm' (DIT tinanced plant and 
equipment not in rate base), then you must offset it with adding in the 'DIT benefit' (DIT 
providcd cost-free capital). No Drr adjustment is required of the Commission's appnllSers 
because they do not attempt to deduct additional depreciation for 'OIT harm.' 
PacitiCorp next takes issue with the Commission's contention that the income shortf~dl 
methodology attributes zero value to plant and equipment not in rate base, that is, the plant and 
equipment financed with DIT. The Response Brief argues that PUCs put all property in rate base 
and diminishes the rate of return allowed on all property to reflect DIT. First, this is not 
!'vIr. Tegardel1's characterization. \11'. Tegarden speaks of .. the regulatory commission's specific 
exclusion of certain properties from the rate hase, i.e. those properties financed by funds 
prmided by the defl:rral of federal income taxes." (Tegarden, Testimony oUuly 14, .20 I 0, p. 34, 
lines 10-14.) Second, PacitiCorp raises a distinction without a difference. Whether a PUC docs 
, The COl1lmission searched for the word "obsolescence" in the ten-y.:ar plan and found it only OIlC':. It is Ill.:ntion.:d 
in a way that Illak.:s c lear it r.:fers to fUllctional. not econolll ic. ohsol.:sc.:nce. I Responci.:nt·s Exh ibit :) 1(1. Paci tiCorp 
20()1{ 2017 T':Il-Year Plan (s.:aled). p. 132.] l'acitiCorp's apprabal claims ecolh)lnic. not functional. ubsuicscence. 
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not allow DIT tinanced plant and equipment into rate base or allows it into rate base and then 
diminishes the allowed rate of return to adjust for DIT, the mathematical results are the same. 
Regardkss of\\hieh formulation we use, PaeitiCorp's argument is: (1) only property that earns 
money has value, (:2) property not included in rate base does not earn money. therefore (3) 
property not included in rate base has zero value and a reduction for obsokscence properly 
relkcts this. The Commission agrees with the Oregon Supreme Court: property acquired using 
DIT has intrinsic value and must be taxed. Pacific POlrer & Ughl v. Deportment oj" Rel'elllle. 
,,,'tale oj"Oregon. 775 P.2d 303 (at 3(8).308 Or 49 (at 57-58.) 
PaciliCorp next argues that the Commission's reliance on the sale price of PacitiCorp 
in 2006 to undermine Mr. Tegarden's appraisal is problematic because the evidence before the 
district court was that the sale price included non-taxable and exempt assets, tc)r example. 
goodwill. There arc a number of points to make. First, this misses the Commission's point. 
Mr. Tegarden did not even consider the sale because he said it was not a market sale. The 
Commission pointed out that under Idaho Code it was indeed a market sale. Mr. Tegarden had 
no business ignoring it. Second, PacifiCorp ignores how non-taxable property is subtracted from 
value. Determine unit value, then subtract out exempt property. The sale is useful as a reality 
check for determining unit value, 'vvhieh is, after aiL the point of this case. Third, PaciliCorp 
argues that more than 10 percent of the sales price was attributable to goodwill and goodwill is 
not taxable. nut this last point undercuts PaciliCorp'sjustitication for obsolescence. namely that 
PaciliCorp \vill al\\ays earn below its "required rate of return." "Gomh,ill." by delinition. is the 
"abilitv of a business to generate income 1/1 excess of a normal rate . 
(IDAPA 35.01.03.615.01.f.) PaciliCorp cannot argue both that it reqUIres an obsolescence 
adj lIstment because it under-carns and that part of the sales price should be deducted because it 
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n:lleeted good\\"ill resulting from over-earning. If Mr. Tegarden had only tried to address the 
market sale of PacitiCorp in 2006, he might have discussed these things. But he did not. 
Arriving at a value for PacifiCorp and not even considering the sale that took place less than two 
years before is a major flaw in the appraisal. At a minimum, the sale is a valuable reality check. 
It is one PacifiCorp's appraisal t~lils. The 2006 sales price \vas over $9 billion. Bet\veen 2006 
and 20()8, approximately $2 billion was added to the company. Y ct PacifiCorp's cost approach 
values the company at about $8.81 billion. Including the income l~lctor, PacifiCorp asserts its 
overall value is $8.35 billion. (Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal. p. 27.) 
The Commission argued that one of the reasons the PacitiCorp appraisal is unreliable is 
because it surreptitiously and dramatically changes the weighting of the incomc approach and thc 
cost approach. PacitiCorp objects to the word "surreptitious." The Commission stands by it. 
Each of thc other appraisals forthrightly states thc weight it attachcs to the difTcrent indicators of 
value used whcn arriving at a tinal value. Only PacifiCorp's appraisal does not. This is a defect. 
If one value indicator gives a high estimate of value and another indicator gives a lower one, then 
the linal value can be dramatically changed by giving more weight to one and less to the other. 
This is thc rcason the weighting ought to be specifically noted. Mr. Rudd and Mr. Tegardcn each 
used two indicators of value. cost and income. Mr. Rudd weightcd them 45 percent 
and 55 percent, respectively. PaciliCorp's unstated wcights arc approximately 19 perccnt and 81 
p ..... rc ..... nt. Because the income indicator is the less ..... r value. this \veighting lowers the lin~d valu ...... 
This could have been forthrightly stated. It was not. \Vhen he was kstifying. [,vir. Tegarden 
admitted he did not assign weights to the various indicators. (Tegarden, Testimony of July 1 .. 1.. 
20 I O. p. 85, line 25.) PacifiCorp notes that Mr. Eyre assigned only 20 percent weight to the cost 
indicator. but f'vlr. Eyre lIsed three approaches to valuc. not t\\o . 
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PacifiCorp next argues that the income shortt~tll method does not reduce the cost 
approach to the income approach. This is true when the income shorthlll method is properly 
used. ,\n example of its proper use is j~)Und in Appraisal oj'Real Estate, discussed earlier, in 
\vhich a stand-alone stllcture's obsolescence-caused income shortl~lll \\as precisely measured. 
The measurement did not rely on considerations of weighted cost of capital and rate of return 
developed in the income approach. PaciJiCorp' s income shortbll method is not properly used. 
It j~lctors earnings into its cost approach by relying on both the capitalization rate (weighted cost 
of capital: required rate of return) and the rate of return developed in its income approach. It 
then uses these ligures to adjust the cost approach to approximate the income approach. When it 
does this, it effectively turns the cost approach into the income approach. As the Oregon 
Supreme Court disapprovingly noted, it "e1iminates a relevant perspective from consideration." 
United Te/I.'plwne ('0. v. Department oj'Rl.'vel1l1e, 770 P.2d43 at 51. (S.Ct. Or. 1989.) 
The next point comes about when the Commission points out that the income shortt~lll 
approach measures short1~tll caused by J~lctors other than obsolescence. It provides a list of 
possibilities, including bad management. PacifiCorp argues that the Commission "j~lils to 
marshal any evidence to support its criticism of PacifCorp's appraisal on this particular basis." 
(Response BrieL p. 36.) This is merely an attempt to shin the burden of proof to the 
COlllmission. When PacifiCorp uses a methodology that measures both ohsolescence and non-
llhsolescence, it is up to PacifiCorp to demonstrate that its method does not include an)thing but 
llbsolescence. It never did this. In j~lcL lIsing PacifiCorp's income shortl~t11 methodology, it 
cannot separate the effects of obsolescence from faetors that are not obsolescence. 
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Responding to the Commission's argument that Mr. Tegarden's approach is far too 
subjectin~, PacifiCorp notes that all appraisal has an clement of subjectivity. This misses the 
point. Appraisals that minimize subjectivity are better than appraisals that do not. PacifiCorp's 
use of the income shortfall approach is excessively subjective. Examples of this were previously 
noted. For tax year 2008, Mr. Ross, representing PacitiCorp before the Commission, claimed 
obsolescence in excess of 26 percent. Mr. Tegarden found less than 21 percent for the same 
year. As noted in the opening briet: however, for tax year 2005, Mr. Tegarden found PacitiCorp 
had more than 30 percent obsolescence. The diffcrenee in these figures results in huge swings in 
value. Another example of subjectivity lies in the selection of the calculation to determine the 
percentage of obsolescence. Taking Idaho's allowed rate of return as an example, Ring and 
Boykin's formula results in less than one half the obsolescence Mr. Tegarden caleulates. A third 
example of subjectivity lies in the figure selected for weighted cost of capital. Three appraisers 
selected three different figures, Mr. Tegarden's being the highest. or course, one of the lm~jor 
subjective elements is the use of a method that measures income shortfall resulting from f~lctors 
that are not obsolescence and assume it is obsolescence. 
How can this subjectivity be minimized? Suppose PaciliCorp has a co~tl-fired plant that 
is subject to new, more stringent, clean air requirements. Rather than make the large investment 
needed to improve the plant. the company decides to shut it down. The value of the closed plant 
remaining after depreciation may well result in economic obsulescenee. The point is, 
llbsolescence based on a specific claim can be calculated. :\ specific regulatory action is 
identificd, its effect on specific plant and equipment is shown, the effect is lJuantified. Factors 
unrelated to obsolescence arc eliminated. Do this for each item claimed to contribute to 
obsolescence. Add them lip. 0!O\\ subjectivity is minimized . 
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CONCLUSION 
The income shortfall methodology used in PacifiCorp's appraisal is seductive. The 
Commission should knmv. It partially fell for it in 2006.6 It can be made to sound reasonable. It 
llses numbers, and numbers cannot err, can they? Well, yes they can. If the assumptions and 
methodological navvs underlying the numbers are t~nIity, the numbers are not reliable. The 
Commission identifies a number of nssumptions and tlaws. It urges that these can be minimized 
by adopting the position that claims for obsolescence be proven with evidence of the specific 
cause of the obsolescence, the quantity of the obsolescence. and that the asserted obsolcscence 
actually affects the value of the property. It respectfully asks the Court to so hold. It further asks 
the Court (0 hold that, as PacifiCorp did not provide such proof: it did not mecl its burden of 
proof and that the Commission decision it appealed be upheld. 
DATED this I ill day of November 2011. 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
" PaciliCorp claimed 31.S percent and got 13 percent. PacifiCorp argues that because the incomc ,11UrIl:illmethod 
\1 a~ in ~(){J(). it should cUlltinuc tll bc recogni/ed. Ihat a mistake \\<1S madc in thc past is nut an 
arl!lIl11cnt fix continuing to makc thc mistake in the future. 
\PPLLL\.'JT'S RLPLY [WIH - 17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the 1 ill day of November, 201 L I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by the method indicated below 
and. addressed to each of the following: 
RICHARD.J ARMSTRONG 
\\/OOD JENKINS LLC 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
DAVID.r CRAPO 
CRAPO SMITH PLLC 
299 SOUTH MAIN SUITE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
CLERK OF TIlE COURT 
SUPREME COURT BUILDING 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-2210 
\PPLLL\01rS REPLY BRIEF - 18 
_-"X--,,-- U. S. I'vlai I. postage prepaid 
___ lland Delivered 
___ Overnight Delivery 
___ Telecopy (Fax) 
_-"X-,,-' _ U.S. Mail. postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered ---
___ Overnight Delivery 
___ Telecopy (Fax) 
___ U.S. l'vlail. postage prcpaid 
X Hand Delivered 
--"-"--
___ Overnight Delivery 
___ Telecopy (Fax) 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in compliance 
\\ith all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was served on each 
party at the following email addresses: 
RIC I lARD J ARMSTONG 
WOOD JENKINS LLC 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841 1 1 
DAVID J CRAPO 
CRAPO SMITI I PLLC 
299 SOUTH MAIN SUITE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
CLERK OF II IE COURT 
SUPREME COURT BUILDING 
PO BOX 83720 
BorSE ID 83720-2210 
sctbrie fs({~~i dco urts. net 
_-"-X--'-- U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
I-land Delivered ---
___ Overnight Delivery 
___ Telecop)' (Fax) 
_-"-X--'-- By copy of CD 
_~_ U.S. Mail. postage prepaid 
I Jand Delivered ---
___ Overn i ght Dc I i very 
___ Telecopy (Fax) 
_--'-X--'-- By copy of CD 
___ U.S. Mail. postage prepaid 
I-land Delivered ---
___ Overnight Delivery 
___ Telecopy (Fax) 
X Electronic Mail 
-~-
Dated and certified this 1 ill day of November, 2011. 
~= CARL E. OLSSON 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
\PPLI.L\i\rS RI:PLY BRII:F 19 

